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1. Introduction 
The dual character of imperatives, command (or directive) and permission (or concession), has been a 
long lasting puzzle (e.g. Portner 2004/2007, Condoravdi & Lauer 2012, Kaufmann 2012, among many 
others). 
(1) Clean up your room! [command] 
(2) OK, go out and play (if you want to). [permission] 
The aim of this paper is to make a contribution to the understanding of the semantic/pragmatic relation 
between the dual character of imperatives and exhaustivity by focusing on the Japanese focus particle "dake" 
'only'. The dual effect of imperatives also occurs with dake. When dake occurs in command imperatives, 
we obtain a prohibition inference that we can paraphrase as "It is necessary for the addressee not to…", as 
exemplified in (3): 
(3) [Context: The speaker does not want the addressee to drink any alcohol at the party tonight:] 
(Kyoo-wa) [mizu]p-dake(-o) nom-e! 
today-TOP water-DAKE(-Acc) drink-IMP 
'Only drink water (today)!' 
ヘ→ It is necessary for the addressee not to drink {beer, sake, wine}. 
Interestingly, in permission contexts, imperatives with dake convey the inference like "It is not necessary 
for the addressee to .. " as in (4): 
(4) [Context: The addressee is a lightweight drinker. The speaker thinks that the addressee does not 
have to force himself to drink alcohol at the party tonight:] 
(Murisuru-na yo.) [Mizu]p-dake(-o) nom-e! 
(overwork-IMP.NEG SFP) water-DAKE(-Acc) drink-IMP 
'(Take it easy.) Only drink water!' 
ヘ→ It is not necessary for the addressee to drink {beer, sake, wine}. 
Current theories of imperatives like Portner (2010) or Kaufmann (2012) assume that there is no semantic 
difference between command and permission imperatives. If this is true, how do the two inferences of dake-
imperatives come about? This question can be approached from these two perspectives: namely, (i) why do 
command imperatives with dake convey some notion of prohibition?, and (i) how can we provide an account 
for the fact that permission imperatives with dake induce the permission inference rather than prohibitions? 
-1-
These accounts have not been typically presented in a (formal) linguistic theory since almost al studies of 
dake have exclusively focused on declaratives so far. 
The upshot of this paper is as follows. I argue that: (i)'exhaustification in imperatives'is not equal to' 
exhaustification of imperative speech acts'but is equal to'exhaustification of the (weak) necessity operator,' 
and (i) the two inferences of imperatives with dake are generated by the scope interaction of dake and the 
necessity operator. 
2. Basics 
2.1. The Semantic of DAKE'Only' 
In this study, I simply assume that the exhaustivity operator'exh'(Fox 2007, Chierchia et al. 2012, 
among others) associated with dake identifies a proposition as the most informative out of a given alternative 
set, as shown in (5): 1 
(5) [ exh(ALT〈st,t〉)(p〈s,t〉)(w)] = p(w)八¥/<JE Nw(p, ALT) : -,の(w)
, where Nw(p, ALT) is a set of alternatives that: are not weaker than p. 
exhALT(P) identifies a proposition'p'as the most informative out of a given alternative set alt(p). Technically, 
exh isa function which takes p, a world'w'and the alternative set'ALT(p),'and returns the two-part meanings 
that (i) p is true in w and (i) al the alternatives that are not weaker than p are false in w (: ,cp(w)). The 
example and its interpretation are illustrated as follows: 
(6) (Who came to the party yesterday?) 
[Taro ]p-dake(-ga) ki-ta yo. 
T.-DAKE(-NOM) come-PAST SFP 
'Only Taro came.' 
(7) Interpretation of (6): 
Alternative utered 
a. ALT([(6)]) = { came(P, Taro) , came(P, H anako), came(P, Jiro)} 
Alternatives which are not true 
b. [(6)]w and ,came(P, Hanako), ,came(P, Jira) 
Intuitively, dake in (6) conveys the meaning "Taro came, and people other than Taro did not come." 
2.2. The Brief Semantics of Imperatives 
In this paper, I follow the widely accepted assumptions of the semantics of imperatives, as summarized 
11'm less clear on how to deal with the current issues from the point of view of Tomioka (2015), who 
suggests that dake is not simply an exhaustive operator, but is an element which denotes the MAx-degree of 
alternatives (See Tomioka 2015). 
_ C) _ ,. 
in the bullets below:2 
• Imperative speech act itself is represented as an imperative operator'imp'('update operator'in 
the sense of dynamic accounts by Portner (2004/2007), or'directive operator'in the sense of truth 
conditional accounts by Kaufmann (2012), which is not assumed to be a part of a proposition. 
• There is no semantic difference between command and permission imperatives (Portner 2010, Kauf-
mann 2012). 
• Differences in function among imperatives depend on the pragmatic grounds i.e. contexts upon which 
the imperative is issued (ibid). 
Based on the above understandings, let me consider the example imperative in (8). When we say "Go to 
school!" in out-of-the-blue contexts, namely in command contexts, the utterance puts a sort of content that 
'the addressee is required to go to school'on the common ground (Kaufmann 2012), or updates the context 
by adding a property that the addressee goes to school (Portner 2004/2007). I will show that both of the 
views are compatible with the current study. 
(8) Go to school! (out-of-the-blue) 
a. [ (8)] = imp[go(school, addr)] 
b. CG(common ground) <; [addr is required to go to school] (Kaufmann's modal view) 
or 
TDL(To-do lists)④ [addr go to school] (Portner's dynamic view) 
How about the case in permission context? Current theories of imperatives (e.g. Portner 2010, Condoravdi & 
Lauer 2012, Kaufmann 2012) suggest that permission imperatives arise when the content of the imperatives 
is inconsistent with the context i.e. CG or TDL. See the example in (9): 
(9) [Context: addr (=A) is prohibited to go to school because of the serious flu.] 
A: Mom, I feel much better now. 
B: Are you sure? …OK, go to school. 
In (9), the content of the imperative (='the addressee goes to school') ispragmatically inconsistent with 
the content in the given context (='the addressee is prohibited to go to school'i.e.'the addressee cannot 
go to school'), hence deriving the effect of permission imperatives. 
3. Puzzles 
3.1. Computation Trouble 
2See von Fin tel & Iatridou (2017) for the overview of the two major approaches to the semantics/pragmatics 
of imperatives (The truth conditional approach of Kaufmann (2012) and the dynamic semantic approach of 
Portner (2004/2007). 
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Under the current assumptions, let me first apply the meaning of dake (: (5)) to the command imperative 
in (10) (=(3)). 
(10) [Context: The addressee drank way too much last night. The speaker does not want the addr to 
drink any alcohol at the party tonight:] 
(Kyoo-wa) [mizu]p-dake(-o) nom-e! 
today-TOP water-DAKE(-Acc) drink-IMP 
'Only drink water (today)!' 
























































































































































































































































































As the illustration in (11), the alternative in this context would be like'the addressee drinks water','the 
addressee drinks beer','the addressee drinks wine','the addressee drinks wine'. When the command im-
perative with dake is uttered, these alternatives are evaluated by the exhaustive operator associated with 
dake, and non-weaker alternatives, namely'the addressee drinks beer','the addressee drinks wine', and 
'the addressee drinks wine', are negated, thus deriving the meaning'the addressee does not drink {beer, 
sake, wine}'. Obviously, the analysis fails to get the right interpretation that we want here; (11 b) does not 
represent a prohibition inference. 
3.2. Exhaustification over Speech Acts? 
One possible resolution is to assume that dake can exhaustify an imperative'speech-act'. Hara (2007) 
suggests that the meaning of dake involves exhaustification of (potential) speech acts including imperative 
acts, as shown in (12): 
(12) [ dake(ALT)(S)(w)] = S(w) I¥ le/a E Nw(S, ALT): ,a(w) 
, where a isan alternative speech-act that is not weaker than S. 






























































































































































































































































































































































(13b) seems to capture the correct interpretation of the given utterance; the interpretation in (13b) is com-
patible with the context in (3)/(10). However, we are stil facing some problems. The given meaning in 
(13b) (='I don't make commands about {beer, sake, wine}') cannot be distinguished from a permission 
interpretation; how can we only derive a prohibition inference, excluding the possibility of a permission 
inference in this context?-Clearly, further explanation is needed. Moreover, whether dake (or English 
only) can quantify over speech acts or not remains under discussion (cf. Haida & Repp 2012, Hara 2014). 
Thus, I will propose the alternative (and perhaps the'minimal') account of the discourse effects of dake in 
imperatives that is parallel to the account of the case in declaratives, maintaining the denotation of dake. 
4. Proposal & Analysis 
I propose that the dual inference of imperatives with dake can be derived by the scope interaction of 
the (weak) necessity modal which is part of the semantics of imperatives and the exhaustivity operator 
associated with dake: concretely, (i) in command contexts, the exhaustification by dake happens at the level 
of the propositional content as in the case in declaratives, and (i) in permission contexts, dake exhaustifies 
the (weak) necessity modal associated with the imperative morphology. 
4.1. The Weak Necessity Semantics for Imperatives 
Before moving on to illustrate the proposal in detail, I introduce the brief semantics of weak necessity 
for the current analysis. In this paper, I adopt the analysis of Medeiros (2013) and Ihara & Noguchi (to 
appear) that canonical form imperatives (i.e. in Japanese, imperative-form imperatives like "/-ke!"'Go!') 
semantically represents the modal content called weak necessity modal'□ wn'(Silk 2013) which operates 
independently of the imperative (or directive) speech-act operator, and are roughly equivalent to ought or 
should in their interpretation. 
The specific analysis of imperatives therefore depends completely upon the formal analysis of weak 
necessity. I adopt the formal treatment of weak necessity presented in Silk (2013). Silk's model of weak 
necessity depends upon premise sets P, which simplify the interaction of modal base and ordering source 
within Kratzerian modal semantics (Kratzer 1981/1991). Premise sets P describe functions that context 
supplies for the interpretation of modals; an unsaturated premise set P supplies this context. The value of P 
given a world of evaluation is a saturated premise set P(w). First, within this model, strong necessity must 
is defined as follows:3 
(14) [must(p)] = 1 if nP(w) s; [p] (Silk 2013) 
(i.e: the truth of'Must(p)'is checked by comparing whether the conditions in the evaluation world 
w are s.t. the premise set P(w) verifies the necessity of p.) 
3Note that strong necessity modal must cannot pattern with weak reading such as permissions: 
(i) # You must open the window, if you're cold. 
(i) You should/ought to open the window, if you're cold. 
- fi-
Silk relates weak necessity to strong necessity in terms of conditional or contingent necessity; weak necessity 
therefore defines what is necessary if certain conditions hold. Formally, and making use of a selection 
function 1{ which selects a set of x-worlds that are closest to w (x picks out a set of relevant worlds that 
are preferred in some contextually relevant sense i.e. most normal, expected, desirable), weak necessity 
ought/should is defined as (15), such that'ought/should p'makes a claim about the necessity of pat al 
closest relevant x-worlds, for some contextually supplied condition x. 
(15) [ought/should(p)] = 1 if lfw'E 1-l(w,x): nP(w')~[p] (Silk 2013) 
(i.e.:'ought/ should(p)'is true if the contextually preferred worlds w'verify the necessity of p, 
namely if p follows from the relevant Pat every w'E Ji(w, x).) 
The key here is that the weak necessity of pis not evaluated at world w, but at the worlds w'E Ji(w, x). Un-
der this model, weak necessity is contingent necessity. Therefore, under the right contextual circumstances, 
canonical imperatives (and therefore weak necessity modals) can very closely approximate a strong neces-
sity modal. Ihara & Noguchi (to appear) suggests that Japanese imperative form imperatives semantically 
encodes the weak necessity, as they can pattern both with strong (i.e. commands) readings and weak (i.e. 
permission) readings. 
4.2. Proposal: Exhaustification over/under Necessity 
Based on the assumptions, I propose the following LF for imperatives with dake in command contexts 
as shown in (16). As I have already mentioned, in command contexts, the exhaustification of dake happens 
at the level of the propositional content, specifically under the weak necessity, as in the case in declaratives. 








rl exh C 
＼ 
P〈s,t〉
~ [ <Y ]J .. Vimp・・・ 
'OPAt'is a simple alternative-generating operator without any quantificational meanings (Tomioka 2009). 
Focus is interpreted by the squiggle operator which introduces a covert variable C at LF that receives its 
value from the context through the variable assignment function g0 (Rooth 1992). 
With dake having the scope in (16), the imperative in (10) should be interpreted as illustrated in (17): 
- G-
(17) [S: imp[口wn[ dake (p)]]] = V¢ E Nw(S, ALT) [口wn-,ゆ］
Now we can obtain the following meaning from (16) and (17) as follows, which represents the right 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rl exh Cperm ／ 亡lwn 
P〈s,t〉
[a0,., 
, where CpermコCGsuch that CG~[p of imp(p) is prohibited]. 
In (19), exh receives the context C, and if C is the context which satisfies the presupposition of permission, 
namely Cperm i.e. where the addressee is prohibited to do p (the propositional content or property of the 
given imperative, Portner 2010), it takes wide scope to fit the context.4 With dake having wide scope, 
imperatives in permission contexts should be interpreted as (20): 
4This would happen because of presupposition accommodation. Asume that in imperatives, command contexts are unmarked and 
permision contexts are marked (Portner 20 I 0). When a given context satisfies the presupposition of permision i.e. when the addrese 
is prohibited todo p (the propositional content or property of the given imperative), the addressee would think that the inference which 
can be obtained by command imperatives (as in (16)) does not fit the context. Due to this, dake quantifies over necessity modal, not 
under the modal, to accommodate the presupposition. 
- 7-
(20) [ S : imp [ dake [口wn(p)]]] = V¢ E Nw(S, ALT) [-, ロwn<P]
From (20), we obtain the following interpretation for the permission imperative in (4): 
(21) Murisuru-na yo. (Kyoo-wa) [mizu]p-dake(-o) nom-e! (= (4)) 
ロwn[drink(water,addr)]
a. ALT(口wndcink (water, add,)))~{ 口］二塁::::ご闊
b. :,(:)]:D:, □;; 1:'.~i~::(::,:: こ）~:~:l:]~:::~:::::)こここ；［こここ;':)]
The computation goes as follows. When a command imperative'imp(口wnc/>1)'is uttered, the alternatives 
｛口wnc/>1,ロwnc/>2,ロwnc/>3,にlwnc/>4)are evaluated by exh, and al the non-weaker alternatives are negated, 
thus deriving {-, ロwn必'-,□ wn如'-,□ wn釘 ｝＝｛◇-,伽，◇-,如，◇-,四｝．
Focusing only on the modal, the present proposal has the following properties. First, under the current 
analysis, we can logically handle the dual character of imperatives with dake. Secondly, since it says nothing 
about embeddability of speech-acts, a special modification for the semantics of dake is not needed. 
5. Embedded Exhaustification in Imperatives 
A prediction from the proposed analysis is that we can handle the meaning of embedded-imperatives 
with dake without saying anything about embeddability of speech-acts or propriety of exhaustification over 
speech-acts. While most languages impose strong restrictions on imperatives in embedded contexts (to the 
point of banning them altogether), Japanese allows imperative markers in to-marked complements of speech 
reporting predicates. While to can, in principle, introduce both direct speech (quotational constructions) 
and indirect speech, Kuno (1988) adduces examples where the behavior of indexicals refutes an analysis 
as direct speech (See also Kaufmann 2012). The sentence in (22), for example, shows that imperatives 
with dake can also be embedded under indirect discourse; the indexical kare'he'='John'indicates that the 
embedded imperative in (22) is not a direct discourse. The key here is that (22) is ambiguous between (i) 
the speaker's view (= (23a): the implicature relativized to the speaker) and (i) Taro's local view (= (23b): 
the implicature relativized to Taro). 
(22) Johni-ga Mary-ni [karei-no ronbun-dake yom-e] to meireishi-ta. 
John-NoM Mary-to his paper-DAKE read-IMP COMP give.an.order-PAST 
'John ordered Mary to read only his paper.' 
(23) a. The (actual) speaker believes that only as for John's paper, John said "Read!" to Mary. 
b. John believes that it is necessary for Hanako to read only his paper. 
The present analysis straightforwardly captures the two readings in (23); the ambiguity depends on whether 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Little work has been devoted to the semantic/pragmatic relation between dake and imperatives. In this 
paper, I have argued that the dual character of imperatives with dake are generated by the scope interaction 
of the operators, namely the necessity operator and the exhaustivity operator. The present analysis is theo-
retically important because the'minimal semantics'view of imperatives that the denotation of imperatives 
is simply'p'(Portner 2004/2007) cannot spell out the dual meanings; the view that imperatives do contain 
an operator which is interpreted like necessity modals (e.g. Kaufmann 2012) is needed. 
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